BOOK REVIEWS.

s8g.

considered fall naturally into four general classes-viz., Those
powers which belong exclusively to the several states; those
which belong exclusively to the General Government; those
which may be exercised concurrently by both the states and
the United States, and those which may be temporarily exercised by the states, but only until Congress, by some direct
action, assumes the exercise of the power in behalf. of the
Federal Government.
One feature which is lacking, and that would have added
very materially to the value and usefulness of the book, is a
complete index, and, possibly, a list of authorities cited.
W.C.M.
NOTES ON RECENT LEADING ARTICLES IN LEGAL PERIODICALS.
CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL.-JUly 7.
In How Far May Acts of the Legislature be made Contingent upon

Being Accepted by Popular Vote without Violating the Principle that
Legislative Power Cannot be Delcgated? F. E. Williams. The theory
of the separation of the sovereign powers of the government is one

that has had centuries of discussion; has seemed to be settled; has
come again under discussion from ultra modern points of view in these
days of the new century. To review a paper of this kind would be to
go over the old ground again and add a discussion of the newer
theories, which do not supplant, but rather 'supplement, the old. The
author of this paper does not, however, call for quite so exhaustive
a discussion; he takes for granted the theory that legislative power
cannot be delegated, and from that goes on to attack his problem as
stated in his title. He first examines the form of the act, which he
states to be of great importance; the act must be in presenti to take
effect in futuro-that is, it must not leave to the people the responsibility
of making the law, but only of declaring whether they will accept it
or not. "The importance of a complete form of an enactment of this
kind is illustrated when the courts say that 'the vote should spring from
the law and not the law from the vote,' and that the legislature must
exercise its own judgment definitely and finally on the expediency of
the act, and in effect declare it to be inexpedient if the vote is unfavorable." Having satisfied the form, the act may be submitted to the
people without violating the principle that legislative power cannot be
delegated. As to manner of operation, an examination is made into
the operation of general statutes, local option statutes, and special local
option statutes, finding that "the weight of authority holds that in the
absence of express constitutional authorization a legislative act cannot
be made contingent upon being accepted by a popular vote of the state
at large." As to general local option laws, we find that they are generally upheld, the reasons for this being given with a good deal of particularity. Special local option laws have also been upheld. As to the
subject matter of the act, we find that a great variety of subjects have
been acted upon, but they are restricted to matters of local interest
and concern, and cannot include matters of general interest and concern
to all the people of the state or country. Lastly we find that there are
constitutional provisions which may affect a particular case, and here
again the wording of the act may be of great importance. Mr. Williams
summarizes his conclusions as follows:

BOOK REVIEWS.

"First. Independent of any express constitutional authorization,
the enactment, operation, or taking effect of a legislative act cannot be
made contingent upon popular acceptance by the state at large, for the
reason that such acceptance is inconsistent with our system of representative government and is therefore construed as a violation of the
principle that legislative power cannot be delegated.
"Second. In the absence of an express constitutional limitation,
local option laws both general and special, if confined to local affairs,
may be passed, although their operation is contingent upon a favorable
vote of the districts to be affected, and such laws do not violate the
principle that legislative power cannot be delegated, for the reason
that they are justified by virtue of the power and discretion of the
legislature in its control of public corporations, and because of their
analogy to the system of local self-government which existed in
America before our constitutions were adopted and in the mother
country from time immemorial."
GamN BAG-July.
Charles Joseph Bonaparte as a Lawyer. William Reynolds. Mr.
BonaparLe's very interesting personality has taken on a still more interesting phase since his coming into a Cabinet position and the stirring
manner in which he immediately began upon his duties there. The
Gr.'en Bag offers to its readers another opportunity, among the many
now given by newspapers and periodicals, to become a little better
acquainted with Mr. Bonaparte. The paper is written from the viewpoint of one who has had a very intimate personal acquaintance with
his subject, and who wishes to give the intimate personal view rather
than the general broad view of one who writes only from knowledge
of the public life of the man written about. We hear about Mr. Bonaparte's first case and how he went to it in his own carriage while
others "climbed the court-house hill on foot," but we are also told
that he has never practised law to make money; that is, he has regarded the faithful practice of the profession itself as "a far more
important consideration than the amount of the pecuniary reward."
His. first political case was in 1875, and few people will need to be told
that it was vigorously conducted. From that time he has constantly
been "in politics" as a reformer. One would imagine without being
told-and yet it is well to be told-that Mr. Bonaparte "does not
pursue the methods of the mere 'case hunter" who crams himself for
the occasion by the use of Digests and the Encyclopedia of Law and
Equity, but adopts one somewhat similar to that of Chief-Justice
Marshall, who used to say that after a difficult or important case had
been argued before him, his habit was to take a long walk by himself
and think it over, until he had arrived at a decision." The opinion
given of Mr. Bonaparte by Mr. Seavern Teakle Wallis, and quoted by
Mr. Williams, would seem to be one of exceptional insight. Mr. Wallis
said 'he presented a more remarkable combination of perfect selfconfidence and naive diffidence than he had ever met with in the same
person,' and Mr. Williams confirms this opinion, saying: "The result
of thirty-years' close observation of Mr. Bonaparte has convinced me
that Mr. Wallis's diagnosis was correct. The self-confidence is always
exhibited when he is advocating a cause or a principle that he believes
to be just and of vital consequence, and when lie is defending the
rights of others which he considers unjustly assailed. In doing this
he is absolutely fearless and never has been in anywise a respecter of
persons. The naive diffidence is shown in his absolute lack of selfassertion in all matters relating to his personal advancement or profit."
The Reign of Law. Hon. Joseph W. Folk. Mr. Folk's paper is so
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full of sentences that need quoting that it is a pity to waste space by
inserting ordinary phrases. A few of these quotations are given:
"Business is a good thing, honors are better still, but patriotism
excels them all, and without patriotism one is unworthy to be a member of the legal profession. He is a minister of the law that emanates
from city, state, and nation, and can no more practise law in the true
spirit without patriotism, than can a divine teach the doctrines of a
Christ for whom he has no devotion." "One cannot be a good lawyer
without being honest. Law lnd honesty go together, jests to the contrary notwithstanding." "The reign of law means the rule of the
people, for a majority of the people make the laws. They register
their will crystallized in the form of statutes. We need a revival of
the rule of the people." "It is not for an executive official to say
whether a law is good or bad, but to.enforce it as it is. He should not
ask, is it popular? or, is it good politics? but, is it right? In the end,
if he remains steadfast, the right will win. The trouble has been that
a privileged class have violated the law with impunity and escaped
its consequences. It is not hard to pursue with all the terrors of the
law the wretch who picks a pocket or steals a loaf of bread, but it is
quite another matter when the law is sought to be put against those
who have millions behind them, with political influence enough to
affect an entire community." " If good citizens would join hands in
patriotic endeavor, the lawless could not control anything, for they
constitute but a small proportion of the entire population."
These are good words for us to* hear; we have too often heard
those of the reformer who calls himself "practical,-the Roosevelts
and the Jeromes,-who claim that it is not practical to do the things
that Folk has done. Mr. Folk in words points out the fault in their
reasoning; Mr. Folk in deeds has proven the truth and the virtue of
his own.
Limitation of the Hours of Labor and the Federal Supreme Court.
Professor Ernst Freund. The argument against the validity of the
acts limiting the hours of labor is made upon the ground that they
infringe upon the constitutional right of liberty to contract; the power
to limit these hours is based upon the right to interfere when the
health of the people is being injured. The courts of the various states
have decided the question, some in one way, some in another, and the
arguments from the bench have shown every shade of opinion, no preponderance showing clearly in the decisions upon either side. The'
decision in the New York case of People v. Lochner (73 App. Div. 12o,
177 N. Y. 175) is the one which forms the basis for Mr. Freund's
paper. "By the narrow margin of one vote, to which we have become
accustomed in important constitutional cases, the Federal Supreme
Court has reversed the decisions of the lower New York* courts,
and declared the limitation of hours of labor, sought to be imposed by
the act in question, to be contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment." In
regard to the questions as to the authority and the principles upon
which this decision were based Mr. Freund comes to the conclusion
that the decisions did not bind them, and that the principles were
against the decision, saying, "A decision which reads into the Fourteenth Amendment a vague and controverted concept of the liberty of
contract is a novel, and hardly a fortunate, step in the development
of our constitutional law." The ensuing discussion of the matter is in
excellent temper and shows a wide knowledge of the subject. The
states have been earnest in passing legislation regulating the hours
of labor, the people of the states apparently believing that such regulation, in the face of the great power of the corporations and the helplessness of the individual worker, is necessary to the well-being of the
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persons employed in great masses. The Supreme Court has now
appaiently decided that this is an impairment of the liberty of contract.
Mr. Freund says of this situation: "Even of those who believe such
legislation to be unwise or premature there will be many who will
refuse to believe that it is opposed to immutable principles of justice
or to any fundamental principle of law, and who will regard it as
unfortunate that the highest tribunal should have sought to commit
American jurisprudence to that view. Whatever may be true of ultimate dcvelopmerits-and it is safe to say that a change in public opinion
sufficiently strong and wide-spread would eventually compel judicial
acquiescence, even without a change of the Fourteenth Amendmentit cannot be denied that agitation for labor or social legislation of an
advanced type has suffered a serious check through the decision in
Lochner v. New York."
The Civil and the Common Law. Hon. Emlin McClain. The two
systems are treated as rivals, and we have a very pleasant discussion
of the claims of these rivals, going over, necessarily, the usual ground
as to the influence of the civil law upon the common law as held by
the English-speaking countries. Mr. McClain says: " And so I say
it is that, as the result of what I have called an historical accident, a
rival system of the civil law has been developed among the AngloSaxon peoples and carried wherever Anglo-Saxon power has extended.
And I venture to say, further, that the principles of the common law
are better suited to institutions which recognize the right of self-government and the direct responsibility of the ruler to his subjects, and
the legal equality of all men to participate in the benefits of government
and social order, than are the fundamental principles on which the
civil law is based." The conflict of the civil and the common law
upon this continent and in these states is treated most ably, showing
the allegiance of the peoples of the states to the common law and their
belief that it is best adapted to the needs of a free government. Mr.
McClain holds that "the most fundamentally important characteristic
*of the common law is that it recognizes, not merely theoretically, but
practically, the doctrine that before the law all men are equal." "Now
it is interesting to notice that this fundamental principle is not only not
emphasized in the civil'law, but that the Roman system of government
did not assume it, nor embody it in existing institutions." Arguing
along these lines, we are given not only a very able and interesting
paper, but one which is original in thought, and which offers us a very
different treatment from that usually given to the old discussion upon
the common and civil law and the old arguments as to their merits and
demerits.
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Disfranchisement of West Virginia. L Charles H. Ambler. The
first attempt to restrict the franchise in West Virginia was the bill
known as " The voters' test-oath," whose author is quoted as saying:
"I do not want the rebels to have any share in the government. If
they do, I shall be defeated by five hundred votes." It is to be noted
that the spirit of this remark is not notably patriotic or self-denying,
and it is also to be noted that the same spirit seems to be shown
throughout the entire period which is dealt with in this paper-the
reconstruction period. The bitter partisanship, the disregard of principle in order to secure any advantage, the unscrupulousness of the
methods employed to attain ends, all are set forth here apparently
without malice, it would almost seem,--but it is necessary to remember
that this is only a first instalment,-without consciousness that the
methods are vicious or unusual. The paper is certainly an illuminating
one as regards political conditions in such states as West Virginia in
the reconstruction period.

